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Honesty plays a crucial role in any situation where organisms exchange 
information or resources. Dishonesty can thus be expected to have damaging 
effects on social coherence if agents cannot trust the information or goods they 
receive. However, a distinction is often drawn between prosocial lies (“white” lies) 
and antisocial lying (i.e. deception for personal gain), with the former being 
considered much less destructive than the latter. We use an agent-based model to 
show that antisocial lying causes social networks to become increasingly 
fragmented. Antisocial dishonesty thus places strong constraints on the size and 
cohesion of social communities, providing a major hurdle that organisms have to 
overcome (e.g. by evolving counter-deception strategies) in order to evolve large, 
socially cohesive communities. In contrast, “white” lies can prove to be beneficial 
in smoothing the flow of interactions and facilitating a larger, more integrated 
network. Our results demonstrate that these group-level effects can arise as 
emergent properties of interactions at the dyadic level. The balance between 
prosocial and antisocial lies may set constraints on the structure of social 
networks, and hence the shape of society as a whole. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reciprocity plays an important role in the emergence of cooperation both in real life and 
in theoretical models [1–7]. Though rarely explicitly operationalized in models of 
cooperation, trust plays a central role in this process because it underpins individuals’ 
willingness to engage in exchange interactions [6,8–10]. In this context, deception 
becomes important because it threatens to undermine the delicate balance on which 
trust-based exchange relationships are based. In the evolutionary literature, there has 
been a longstanding concern about the fact that, since deception is potentially 
advantageous to signallers competing for resources, the ease with which it can evolve is 
likely to destroy the stability of trust-based relationships [11,12]. Much of the extensive 
behavioural and evolutionary literature on this topic has been concerned with 
identifying mechanisms for detecting and policing deception and hence the evolutionary 
stability of honest communication, and thus relates closely to the broader literature on 
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the management of free-riders [13]. Most modelling approaches have used evolutionary 
game theory or evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) dynamics [13–16], and many have 
shown that some balance between honesty and deception yields an evolutionarily stable 
outcome, with the ratios between the two states generally dependent on the precise form 
of the payoff matrix [16].  Much of the literature in animal behavioural ecology 
(reviewed in [11,12]) provides empirical support for these theoretically derived 
conclusions. 
 
This approach has been predicated on the (reasonable) assumption that lying is 
destructive because it destabilises the relationship of trust between pairs of interacting 
individuals. As a result, most models have considered panmictic populations in which 
individuals interact indiscriminately with each other. The same has largely been true of 
the extensive animal behavioural ecology literature (reviewed in [11,12]), as well as the 
much more limited empirical literature on this topic in economics [17,18], psychology 
[19,20] and even robotics [21]. However, the populations of most highly social species 
(many birds and mammals, but especially humans and other primates) are highly 
structured [22–24] and the implications of trust (or its converse, deception) for the 
structure of social networks in these cases has not been explored in any detail [25–27].   
 
Such issues may be especially intrusive in intensely social taxa like anthropoid primates 
(including humans), equids, elephants and the dolphin family [28], In these taxa, an 
individual’s fitness is the product of two separate components, namely the 
consequences of its own decisions and the effects that its neighbours’ decisions have on 
its fitness through group-level effects (as reflected in Hamilton’s classic concept of 
neighbourhood modulated fitness [29,30]). In these cases, individuals gain fitness by 
sharing in the collective behaviour of the community to gain protection from predators, 
defend resources or exchange information on the location of ephemeral resources. 
Group-level effects of this kind often depend not only on the size of the group but also 
on how well the group is integrated (or bonded) [31]. Bondedness reflects the level of 
cohesion within the network, its degree of connectedness and its integrity over time. In 
these cases, network integrity becomes a critical component of the individual’s 
inclusiveness fitness, and individuals may lose fitness when actions such as lying 
adversely affect network integrity because they reduce trust. 
 
Some sense of the scale of the issue is provided by the fact that lying appears to be 
surprisingly common among humans: a randomized representative sample of 1,000 
Americans recorded an average of 1.65 lies per day (equivalent to ~550 per person per 
year), although the distribution was highly skewed (23% of all lies were told by 1% of 
individuals, and half of all lies were told by 5% of the respondents) [32]. A number of 
other studies have reported frequencies between 0.6-2.0 lies per day, with lies being less 
common in face-to-face interactions than in telephone interactions [33–35].  Many of 
these may be trivial or prosocial lies (lies to avoid causing offence or lies to protect a 
third party [36]). However, in one study, 92% of respondents claimed to have lied at 
some time to a partner [37], while another study found that 60% of women and 34% of 
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men had lied to obtain sex [38], suggesting that even modest lies may often be used for 
purely personal gain. Equally surprisingly, subjects in experimental games were two to 
three times more likely to cheat if they gained a benefit by doing so [39,40]. 
 
Given this, it is perhaps not surprising that humans are sensitive to both the magnitude 
and the intention of lies: large actual or potential gains for the liar are more likely to be 
frowned on than minimal gains [17,36], even in one-shot games with no possibility of 
future interaction [41]. One possible explanation is the risk of an unfavourable social 
reputation and/or the implementation of strict social sanctions against lying and 
deception [42,43], but a number of studies report that the maintenance of social 
cohesion or relationship stability was viewed as an acceptable motive for lying and, 
more broadly, that prosocial lies are rated as more acceptable than antisocial lies 
[36,44].  
 
In this paper, we focus on the impact that lying has on the coherence and structure of 
social networks and use a recent opinion dynamics model [45] to explore this. 
Conventional approaches to collective action typically focus on the direct payoffs of the 
decisions that individuals make. In contrast, we focus on the extent to which such 
decisions affect network cohesion and the indirect effects that this has on individual 
fitness. This approach shares with the models developed by Dávid-Barrett & Dunbar 
[23,46,47] a focus on achieving behavioural synchrony as an intermediate goal 
necessary for maximising fitness, in line with Hamilton’s conception of neighbourhood 
modulated fitness [29,30]. More importantly, it bypasses the conventional collective 
action dilemma created by free-riders because it is not possible to free-ride: one is either 
in the group or one is not, and one benefits accordingly [46].  
 
We are concerned here not with explaining how deception is counteracted by detection 
mechanisms so that animals can be social (the principal focus of much of the 
evolutionary and economics literature), but rather with exploring whether, and to what 
extent, deception is destructive of sociality. By sociality, we do not mean the dyadic 
relationships that have been the focus of most empirical and modelling studies hitherto, 
but the capacity to build complex, integrated social networks of the kind found in 
socially more complex species such as primates, elephants, and delphinids among the 
mammals [22], and of course humans [24]. 
 
Social psychologists commonly characterize the degree of human deception by 
distinguishing four types of lying: (i) Prosocial, lying to protect someone, or to benefit 
or help others; (ii) Self-enhancement, lying to save face, avoid embarrassment, 
disapproval or punishment or gain an advantage (these lies are not intended to hurt 
anyone, rather they benefit the self); (iii) Selfish, lying to protect oneself at the expense 
of another and/or to conceal a misdeed; and (iv) Antisocial, lying to hurt someone else 
intentionally [17]. In this study, we will distinguish between two general types of lies: 
prosocial lies of type (i) and antisocial lies of types (ii)-(iv). Of these two general types, 
it is widely recognised that antisocial lies are destructive of relationships because they 
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are selfish (the liar gains fitness at the expense of the target of the lie), whereas  
prosocial lies (‘fibs’) help to keep relations in good condition [26,48].  
 
Our analysis will focus explicitly on dyadic patterns of lies (lies to a specific 
individual), because we wish to explore the extent to which lies at the dyadic level 
influence the structure and cohesion of entire networks. For this reason, we hold back 
from introducing an evolutionary dimension to the model so that we can assess, as a 
first step, the impact that different liar phenotypes have on network structure. Lies can 
also be conceived of at the community level (a lie is broadcast to the entire group 
simultaneously, as studied in many cultural diffusion models [49]), though it is possible 
that this requires language. An example of a community-level lie might be the 
promulgation of a particular religious belief (e.g. a god that punishes misdemeanours 
[50]) which, while harmless enough in its own way, may be untrue, yet belief in the lie 
may result in greater community cohesion to the wider benefit of the members. Lies at 
this scale impact on social cohesion in a more direct and obvious way, and are thus less 
interesting for present purposes than whether or not lies at the dyadic level have any 
effect on the cohesion of extended networks. The latter is important because while a 
white lie may be beneficial for a dyadic relationship, it could be so at the expense of 
other relationships or other group members, and hence at the same time 
disadvantageous for the group as a whole. 
 
2. Methods 
 
To study the social implications of deception we use an agent-based model of opinion 
formation in coevolving social networks [49,51], in which a continuous state variable  
xi(t) representing the instantaneous opinion of agent i at time t about an issue or topic is 
bounded between –1 and +1 (i.e. total disagreement and total agreement, respectively). 
Here we represent society by a network of N agents, each connected to ki other agents 
and thus giving rise to a structured society, rather than a panmictic population. In a 
previous model [45], we proposed the basic dynamical equation for the opinion state 
variable of an individual to be as follows, 
 
   
  
   ( )|  |      ( )  (1) 
   
where the first term on the right-hand side represents a “short-range” exchange of 
information or opinion with neighbouring agents, and the second term stands for the 
“long-range” influence of the overall opinion of the network on agent i, which in turn is 
modulated by its attitude parameter αi (for or against the overall opinion fl(i) of the 
crowd, depending on whether the attitude is positive or negative). This system evolves 
with a characteristic time scale dt, referred to as the “transaction time”. With this 
approach we showed that well-connected opinion groups emerge naturally when 
opinion change rises during homophilic interactions, individual attitudes affect society’s 
overall mood, and opinion homogeneity influences network evolution [45]. 
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While we consider this dynamical state equation approach generally valid and useful, 
we need to take into account that in real social networks links often have different 
weights and the exchange of information between two individuals is not necessarily 
truthful. In order to include these two key aspects of agents in a social network into the 
previous model, we introduce a second state variable yi to represent the perception of the 
true opinion xi of agent i by other agents. This means that the true opinion is private, 
while the public opinion can be written as, 
    
 
  
∑    
  
   (   )
  (2) 
   
where wji is a matrix element proportional to the amount of information flowing from 
agent i to neighbouring agent j at the time of interaction t, and ki is the degree of agent i, 
i.e. the size of the set  (   ) comprising its direct neighbours in the network. Then 
the first term of Eq. (1) can be written as, 
 
  ( )  ∑    
  
   (   )
  
 
(3) 
Moreover, the overall opinion now depends on the public variables of agents further 
away in the network, 
 
  ( )  ∑
 
 
   
 (    )
   (   )
 
 
(4) 
where            is the distance between agent i and non-neighbouring agent j. In 
this model an honest interaction between two agents implies wij = xj, while an act of 
deception is construed as manipulating the information wij from true to false, as detailed 
below. 
 
In order to follow the dynamical changes on the weights of the links, we introduce an 
equation for the temporal evolution of the adjacency matrix Aij(t),  
 
    
  
   (  ( )   ( )   ( )   ( ))  
 
(5) 
where the slope T is a function of the four opinion variables involved in each link, and 
the parameter D sets the time scale for link growth. Here we assume that links get 
stronger if a) their values are close to the extremes    (agents have firm convictions), 
and b) the difference between x and y is small (honesty strengthens relations). A suitable 
linear combination that agrees with these assumptions is, 
 
  (|
(     )
 
 
 (     )
 
|   )  
 
(6) 
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Near the point of total conviction (i.e.       ), this expression can have four 
different values: 
1)    , if there is a truthful convergence of opinion (              ).  
2)    , if there is a truthful divergence of opinion (         and         ). 
3)    , if there is a truthful convergence of opinion but public disagreement (   
     and       ). 
4)     , if there is a divergence of opinion involving deception (         and 
      ). 
If the slope T is negative, the link weakens and eventually its weight becomes zero, 
effectively breaking the connection between agents. 
 
Given that in the model the probability that links between agents will be broken is 
proportional to the difference in their opinions (as encoded in the expression for T), a lie 
implying        is beneficial for agent j in that the apparent similarity prevents the link 
with agent i from being broken. We consider this act of deception to be prosocial, since 
agent i also benefits from having such a neighbour (in the sense that the link is likely to 
be reinforced). On the other hand, a value          is bound to create tension between 
differing opinions and thus give rise to antisocial deception (since the opinion 
difference with the neighbour will cause the link to weaken). Overall, we choose to 
write the information flow     as, 
 
    {
   if       and    
   
    (   )   otherwise
  
 
(7) 
where the honesty parameter   is an average measure of how much individuals, given 
the cultural traits of their society, reject lying and the sign of the term including yi 
distinguishes between pro- and antisocial lies. In other words, agents always tell the 
truth to neighbours in a triad (the minimal component of a social subgroup), and tell a 
partial truth to the rest. Here   is taken to vary from 0 (dishonesty) to 1 (honesty). In 
Figure 1 the three possible choices of pairwise interactions, namely to be honest or to lie 
pro- or antisocially, are illustrated. 
 
This development of social structure is based on two main assumptions: (i) honest 
relations between agents with similar opinions growing in strength as time goes by, 
while deceptive relations with divergence of opinion weaken and eventually break the 
link between them; and (ii) agents with fewer links are eager to make new links to avoid 
becoming marginalized. 
 
One of the key features of models like the present one is that the pace at which new 
social network links are created is much slower than the typical time scale for the state 
variable dynamics. This reflects the fact that people do not change their relationships 
very fast. Therefore, we set a time scale g for a network rewiring process that conserves 
the total number of links. To do this we assume that, after gdt time steps of the 
transaction dynamics, agents seek for new relationships. At these times, we count the 
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number nc of weighted links that have been set to zero [due to the dynamics of Eq. (5)] 
and add the same number of links. This is realised by first examining the resulting 
network and assuming that agents with fewer links are more eager to make new ones, in 
particular the agents that are left without links and have become marginalised. Then we 
order agents by ascending number of links (i.e. by their degree) and choose agents to be 
rewired in the order of such list. The number of cut links nc  is related to the number n 
of agents chosen to be considered for a new link by     (   )  , where the right-
hand side is the number of links in a fully connected subgraph of n agents. This relation 
can be rewritten as follows, 
 
  (  √     )    
 
(8) 
The n chosen agents create all previously non-existing links among themselves; if the 
number of links created is still below nc, we connect random pairs of agents until 
reaching nc. In this way the rewiring process keeps the total number of links constant, 
while promoting reconnection for marginalised agents. 
 
It should be noted that the present model contains three different time scales: 1) dt is the 
typical time interval between “transactions” (that is, the dynamics of the opinion state 
variable), 2) Ddt is the time scale with which a link changes its weight, and 3)  gdt 
represents the typical time required to make new acquaintances. 
 
We examine various deceptive scenarios by solving the equations of our model 
numerically, using a simple Euler method with fixed time step. We perform extensive 
simulation runs starting from a random Erdős-Rényi network [52] of size N with 
average degree 〈  〉 and a uniform distribution of initial random opinions in the interval 
(     ). The evolution of the opinions of agents and the coevolution of their network 
is followed for either prosocial or antisocial deception and for a constant honesty 
parameter value  . To allow for a stationary final state in which the properties of the 
network do not change anymore, honest opinions with magnitude greater than one 
become fixed, i.e.       and are considered as the final decision state of the 
population. 
 
3. Results 
 
In Figure 2 we illustrate the effects of pro- and antisocial lying in our modelled social 
network for either semi-honest (     ) or totally dishonest (   ) societies, as 
compared to the structure of a completely honest network (corresponding to     and 
shown at the top of the figure). Here we see that, for prosocial deception in a semi-
honest society, the network becomes separated into two large communities of roughly 
the same size, with strong links within social groups and weak links between them. We 
note that the connections between the two large clusters are due to undecided agents 
with |  |   . In the case of a totally dishonest society with prosocial agents, the two 
large clusters become fragmented into small sub-communities that are basically cliques 
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of individually honest agents, with individually dishonest agents providing weak links 
between groups. Here we consider agent j to be individually honest (dishonest) if its 
individual deception    |     | is smaller (larger) than the average openness in the 
social network,   〈  〉. The effect of fibs is in this way clear, as it facilitates the 
formation of small, tightly connected communities. When the deception process 
dominates, groups become smaller and more tightly linked, and the numerous weak 
links between agents that do not belong to small communities turn out to be exclusively 
between dishonest agents. 
 
Next we examine the effects of antisocial lies, that is, the case in which a deceptive 
information flow takes the form         (   )  . In Figure 2, the two panels in 
the bottom row show the effect of this form of information flow on the topological 
structure of the final network. Note that the social network corresponding to an honesty 
parameter  = 1/2 is much less connected than its counterpart in the case of prosocial 
lies, and shows small communities of honest agents sharing the same opinion but being 
weakly connected by dishonest agents. This effect is even more pronounced when the 
amount of lying increases ( = 0). In this extreme case of universal antisocial lying, 
almost all agents become completely isolated and the network structure is destroyed. 
These results suggest that antisocial lies may destroy the cohesion of a social network, 
whereas prosocial lies may, paradoxically, enhance its cohesiveness. 
 
In the right hand corner of Figure 2 we have investigated the dependence of the number 
of undecided agents on the honesty parameter  for prosocial and antisocial behaviour, 
by monitoring the number of agents j that have not reached a definite decision (i.e. with 
|  |   ). Here we see that for the prosocial case the number of undecided agents 
decreases slightly for an increasing volume of lying, suggesting that prosocial lies 
actually help people make up their minds. In contrast, antisocial deception increases the 
frequency of undecided agents in the network, which shows that misleading information 
may make the process of decision-making very difficult. In the bottom right hand corner 
of Figure 2 we investigate the dependence of the local clustering coefficient, averaged 
over all agents, on the honesty parameter   for prosocial and antisocial behaviour. The 
local clustering coefficient is the probability that two randomly selected neighbours of 
an agent are connected [53], and its average over the whole network serves as an index 
of interconnectedness for the population of agents. We observe that the clustering 
coefficient is quite insensitive to prosocial lies, while it increases enormously with the 
amount of antisocial lies. This result suggests that in a society where one is honest only 
with close friends and family, and totally antisocial with the rest, the structure of society 
becomes fragmented into small but well-connected groups opposing each other. 
 
In Figure 3, we investigate the effect of the individual deception    of agents on two 
local network characteristics in a dishonest (   ) society, both for pro- and antisocial 
lies. One of these is the weighted clustering coefficient, an extended version of the local 
clustering coefficient where the weight     is taken into account [54]; the other is the 
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betweenness centrality, a measure of the number of shortest-paths going through an 
agent [55] reflecting its importance in the social network. Here we see that honest 
agents have low betweenness centrality but high clustering, forming small and tight 
communities with truthful interactions. Moderately deceptive agents maximize their 
betweenness and become very central in the network, acting as bridges between groups, 
since their clustering is seen to decrease rapidly. At the other extreme, totally dishonest 
agents become marginalized, with no centrality or triads around them. This qualitative 
behaviour holds for both kinds of deception, although prosocial lying typically produces 
larger betweenness and lower clustering than antisocial lying. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Although it is widely recognised that deception can have an adverse effect on social 
cohesion, and might hence lead to the fragmentation of social networks, our results 
suggest that in communities dominated by honest individuals, dishonest agents can 
sometimes act as weak links and serve as communication paths between clusters of 
honest agents. More importantly, however, there is a difference between prosocial and 
antisocial deception, since prosocial lies give rise to a rich network structure with tight 
communities connected by weak links (either by liars or undecided agents), while 
antisocial lies tend to radically disconnect the network. Recall that our definition of 
prosocial lies (‘white lies’ or fibs) is that they benefit the recipient at a modest cost to 
the actor, thereby preserving the dyadic relationship between them – in a context where 
an antisocial lie would threaten the stability of the relationship. Lies of this kind seem to 
occur commonly in human interactions: there is experimental evidence, for example, to 
suggest that people may lie or cheat to ensure greater equity of outcomes in economic 
games [56]. This may be important for maintaining relationship equilibrium in networks 
since a highly inequitable distribution of payoffs can be very disruptive (especially in 
traditional small scale societies [57]). This suggests that there may be an important 
distinction to be drawn between prosocial and antisocial lies that has so far escaped the 
attention of evolutionary biologists modelling the evolution of deception.  
 
Prosocial lies at the community scale are likely to depend on language, and will thus be 
unique to humans. Examples might include mass indoctrination via religious or political 
proselytising: these commonly percolate through social networks by cultural 
transmission, but their function is explicitly to facilitate within-community cohesion 
[58]. However, below this is a separate level at which lying might serve a function, 
namely the level of dyadic interactions, which themselves create the networks that give 
a community its particular shape. Many studies of ethnographic societies report that, in 
small scale societies, people are prone to answering questions in the way they think the 
questioner would like to hear rather than by telling the truth (unexpected answers are 
considered rude and hence potentially socially divisive). By ensuring that everyone in a 
community abides by the same rules of behaviour, it is not difficult to see how cases 
like this might ensure that groups continue to provide the kinds of fitness benefits for 
individuals that we noted earlier. Our concern here has been with whether prosocial lies 
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at the dyadic level might also feed back into community level effects by influencing 
network structure and cohesion in a context where an individual is influenced by how 
effectively the community works together to solve core ecological problems. 
 
In this respect, our apparently simple model, with basic social interactions represented 
by minimal rules, allows us to draw some conclusions about the role of deception in 
social interactions. In particular, our findings are reminiscent of the observation that 
humans commonly draw a distinction between prosocial and antisocial lies, and are 
more willing to accept prosocial or ‘polite’ lies in appropriate social circumstances 
[20,59,60]. One may wonder why, if lies are universally considered as bad, there is no 
human society in which they are totally absent. Although we are taught from an early 
age that lying is unacceptable, children nonetheless learn to lie wisely instead of 
eschewing it completely. The results of our study suggest that not all lies are bad or 
necessarily socially destructive; in fact, it seems that some lies may even enhance the 
cohesion of the society as a whole and help to create links with other people. In effect, 
some kinds of lies might actually be essential to the smooth running of society, and if 
so, the balance between pro- and antisocial lies may be crucial in shaping social 
structure. Curiously, our results seem to suggest that totally honest interactions prevent 
diversity in the form of highly clustered social subgroups, while totally dishonest 
interactions result in the destruction of the social network. An intermediate level of 
deception may thus be optimal to perform certain social functions (such as protection 
from outsiders, resource defence and information exchange), especially when social 
systems are complex and multi-layered. 
 
While the distinction between prosocial and anti-social lies is obvious in humans, it is 
not at all clear whether prosocial lies in this sense exist among nonhuman animals. This 
might be because the ability to distinguish between prosocial and antisocial lies and 
intentionally engage in the first in order to maintain network cohesion implicitly 
depends on advanced mentalising (theory of mind) competences [61] as well as 
language. If so, then our model may be explicitly relevant only to humans, since we are 
the only species capable of true mentalising [62]. Our model bears some similarities to 
that of McNamara et al. [63,64], which essentially explores the evolutionary stability of 
different personality types in the context of trust-based relationships – of which the 
propensity to lie or tell the truth might be a relevant exemplar. Their model focuses on 
the way individuals monitor their interactions with others, whereas our model in some 
sense takes this for granted and asks whether beneath this there may still be room for a 
less destructive form of ‘untrustworthiness’, one that might help maintain the integrity 
of dyadic networks in contexts that might otherwise destabilise the relationship. 
 
Nonetheless, it is worth asking what prosocial lies might look like in nonhuman species.  
Possible candidates include distraction displays such as the feigned brooding and 
broken wing displays observed in many shorebirds (plovers, killdeer and lapwing) [65–
67] and fish (e.g. stickleback: [68,69]), although in all these cases deception seems to 
relate mainly to the deceiver’s immediate fitness interests (i.e. offspring survival) rather 
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than the wider interests that we suggest prosocial lies serve in facilitating community 
cohesion. More plausible examples might be animals that give false predator alarms 
when another individual moves too far away from their group (possible examples have 
been noted in vervet monkeys [70]). Other cases of deception in primates that have been 
interpreted as tactical deception [71] (including Kummer’s iconic description of a 
female Papio hamadryas baboon using a rock to prevent her harem male seeing that she 
was grooming with a male from a neighbouring harem, or female chimpanzees 
suppressing their loud post-copulation calls when they know a dominant male [72] or 
female [73] is within earshot) could be interpreted as prosocial rather than pure self-
interest if the aggression that would normally follow the discovery of such behaviour 
had destabilising effects on the group as a whole. In contrast to the case in humans, such 
examples would not be intentional prosocial deception, but functionally they may have 
the same consequences. If so, they might allow mild prosocial deception (the recipient 
benefits) to be distinguished from serious deception (the recipient loses out), and so 
provide a foundation from which truly prosocial lies might evolve in species that have 
the cognitive ability to act in this way.  
 
Our analyses suggest that prosocial forms of deception may only arise in the context of 
socially complex species that have multilevel social systems based on structured 
networks [22], where higher-level groupings provide additional group-level fitness 
benefits [47,74] that make ensuring the continued cohesion of these grouping levels 
functionally important. Nonetheless, given that these two forms of deception can be 
distinguished in at least one species (i.e. humans), it raises the question of whether 
prosocial deception is an evolutionary precursor to selfish, antisocial deception, or an 
emergent property of the latter that evolved as a benefit once deception was well 
entrenched and the species had sufficient cognitive capacity to calculate the 
consequences of behaviour. 
 
Our aim in this paper has principally been to address the consequences for network 
structure of having populations made up of different behavioural phenotypes (honest 
agents vs different kinds of liars). We have deliberately avoided, for these purposes, any 
attempt to explore the evolutionary processes whereby populations achieve an 
evolutionary stable distribution of phenotypes. Instead, we have taken the distribution 
of phenotypes to be fixed and asked how this affects network integrity and 
connectedness. In effect, we view the traits as exogenous. An important follow-up 
study, and one we are actively exploring, is to investigate the way in which a society 
evolves a distribution of phenotypes (i.e. the traits are considered as an endogenous 
component of the system and  change in frequency as a result of selection). 
Establishing, as we have done here, that a prosocial liar phenotype might be beneficial 
in terms of network connectedness has been an important necessary first step on the 
way to this objective since, all else being equal, we would not have expected it to be the 
case, and hence might never have considered it as an option. 
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Figures: 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model of opinion dynamics in a social network consisting of honest 
interactions or exchanges of either prosocial or antisocial lies between individuals. In an 
honest exchange (inside a triad, for example), the flow of information between agents k 
and i matches their true opinions. In the case of prosocial lying, agents i and j try to 
mimic each other’s public opinions. In the third case, agents j and l lie antisocially to 
oppose each other’s perceived view on the subject. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of honest, pro- and antisocial behaviour. On the top and left: 
Final network structure (starting from the same random network with      and 
〈  〉   ) for an honest (   ) dynamics, as well as for semi-honest (     ) and 
completely dishonest (   ) dynamics where agents are allowed to lie pro- or 
antisocially. Node colours are white/black (     ) and light/dark grey (     , 
    ). The size of nodes is proportional to their degree and labels in the honest 
network are arbitrary. The width of the links is proportional to their weight. Observe 
that most links between communities involve undecided agents. On the right: Effect of a 
varying honesty parameter on the final number of undecided agents and the clustering 
coefficient of the network for prosocial (continuous line) and antisocial (dashed line) 
lies. A decrement in   corresponds to an increment of the number of lies. Curves are 
averaged over 10 realisations with      . All results correspond to         , 
    and      . 
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Figure 3. Average effect of individual deception on an agent’s betweenness centrality 
(top) and weighted clustering coefficient (bottom), for prosocial (continuous line) and 
antisocial lies (dashed line) and in the case of a dishonest (   ) society. Typically 
honesty is related to high clustering, as intermediate deception is to high betweenness 
centrality values. All curves are averaged over     realisations with      , 〈  〉  
 ,         ,     and      . 
 
